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Abstract—Cognitive radios enable dynamic spectrum access
where secondary users (SUs) are allowed to operate on the
licensed spectrum bands on an opportunistic non-interference
basis. Cooperation among the SUs for spectrum sensing is essen-
tial for environments with deep shadows. In this paper, we study
the adverse effect of insistent spectrum sensing data falsification
(ISSDF) attack on iterative distributed cooperative spectrum
sensing. We show that the existing trust management schemes
are not adequate in mitigating ISSDF attacks in dynamic settings
where the primary user (PU) of the band frequently transitions
between active and inactive states. We propose a novel context-
aware distributed trust framework for cooperative spectrum
sensing in mobile cognitive radio ad hoc networks (CRAHN) that
effectively alleviates different types of ISSDF attacks (Always-
Yes, Always-No and fabricating) in dynamic scenarios. In the
proposed framework, the SU nodes evaluate the trustworthiness
of one another based on the two possible contexts in which
they make observations from each other: PU absent context
and PU present context. We evaluate the proposed context-aware
scheme and compare it against the existing context-oblivious trust
schemes using theoretical analysis and extensive simulations of
realistic scenarios of mobile CRAHNs operating in TV white
space. We show that in the presence of a large set of attackers (as
high as 60% of the network), the proposed context-aware trust
scheme successfully mitigates the attacks and satisfy the false
alarm and missed-detection rates of 10−2 and lower. Moreover,
we show that the proposed scheme is scalable in terms of attack
severity, SU network density and the distance of the SU network
to the PU transmitter.
I. INTRODUCTION
The dynamic spectrum access (DSA) paradigm, enabled
by cognitive radios, facilitates flexible and efficient spectrum
usage by allowing secondary users (SUs) to use licensed spec-
trum bands of primary users (PUs) on an opportunistic non-
interference basis [1]. The SUs must perform spectrum sensing
in order to avoid interference with the PUs. Cooperative
spectrum sensing (CSS) that exploits the spatial diversity in
the SU network effectively relaxes the sensitivity requirements
on individual SUs and improves the overall sensing perfor-
mance [2]. Distributed cooperative spectrum sensing (DCSS)
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Fig. 1. PU dynamic settings and different types of attackers.
is preferred to a centralized scheme (with a fusion center) as
it is scalable, fault-tolerant and more efficient [3]. DCSS also
enables cooperative sensing in cognitive radio ad hoc networks
(CRAHN) where there is no base station or infrastructure.
The existing DCSS schemes which are inspired by distributed
average consensus algorithms are based on iterative diffusion
and aggregation of data through linear iteration-based or
gossip-based schemes and involve communication with direct
neighbors in the network graph [4]–[6].
Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification (SSDF) [7] is a known
attack for cooperative spectrum sensing schemes, where mali-
cious SUs broadcast falsified sensing data to their neighbors in
order to mislead them and compromise the spectrum sharing
in the cognitive radio network. SSDF attack can cause the
SUs to make incorrect decisions about the PU activity which
will result in increased interference from the SUs to the PU
and will also lead to underutilization of the free spectrum.
Insistent SSDF (ISSDF) attack [8], [9], in particular, is aimed
at iterative DCSS schemes where the attacker not only falsifies
its sensing data but it also broadcasts the falsified value in
every iteration of the cooperation and refrains from updating
its value according to the iterative protocol. Thus, ISSDF
attacks can be very harmful. Figure 1 depicts the behavior
of three main types of attackers that have been considered for
CSS namely fabricating, Always-Yes, and Always-No [10],
[11]. Always-Yes and Always-No attackers constantly broad-
cast high and low power values as their sensing reports,
respectively, regardless of the PU activity state. In contrast,
a fabricating attacker generates a falsified low or high value
indicating the opposite of the true PU activity state.
Distributed trust schemes have been recently introduced for
DCSS that require each SU node to maintain a single sliding
observation vector per each SU [12], [13]. Whenever an SU
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node i receives a value from another node j, node i compares
the reported value from j with its own decision about the PU
state. Based on this evaluation, node i tags the observation
from node j as either an agreement or a conflict and records
that in the corresponding observation vector. The trust score
that node i assigns to j is then calculated based on the ratio of
agreements over the total number of observations (the length
of the observation vector) [12], [13]. We call the above trust
derivation approach “context-oblivious” as the SU nodes do
not distinguish between the observations based on the current
PU activity context. Instead, they make blind observations and
record all of the observations in a single observation vector
regardless of the context.
We will show in this paper that the existing context-
oblivious trust schemes are vulnerable to ISSDF attacks in
dynamic settings, where the PU of the spectrum band transi-
tions between active and inactive states over time. Thus, these
techniques cannot protect the SUs and accordingly the SU
nodes make incorrect detection decisions which are harmful
to both the primary and secondary users of the spectrum.
Figure 2(a) shows an example of the vulnerability of the
existing agreement/conflict context-oblivious trust schemes.
The Always-Yes attacker broadcasts high values (as its sensing
report) all the time, even when the PU is active; therefore,
in an active cycle (the duration when the PU is active), an
honest node will most likely be in agreement with the Always-
Yes attacker. Thus, the attacker seems to be non-malicious
in the view of the honest node. As a result, the attacker
is highly trusted at the end of an active cycle. Figure 2(b)
shows that in an inactive cycle, the Always-Yes attacker who
has earned high trust in the previous active cycle is able to
deceive the honest node to believe that the PU is active. As
a result, the honest SU refrains from using the free channel.
This increased false alarm rate among the honest SUs leads to
no utilization or underutilization of the free spectrum which is
very harmful to the SU network. The context-oblivious trust
schemes have a similar vulnerability in mitigating Always-
No attackers in dynamic settings, as the trust of Always-No
attackers is increased in the PU inactive cycles.
In this paper, we show the vulnerability of the existing
trust management schemes in dynamic settings are due to
the fact that these schemes are context-oblivious. In order to
solve the above-mentioned problem and to mitigate the attacks
effectively, we present the following contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
to introduce a context-aware trust scheme for DCSS in
a mobile CRAHN that is resilient to ISSDF attacks in
dynamic settings where the PU frequently transitions be-
tween active and inactive states. In our proposed scheme,
the trust observations are distinguished based on the
speculated context: PU-Present or PU-Absent context.
Thus, the trust evaluation of a peer SU is significantly
more effective than the current context-oblivious schemes
because it is done in a more informed manner.
• We present a theoretical analysis to evaluate the agree-
ment probability (thus, the level of trust) between the
honest nodes and the attackers in the presence of different
types of ISSDF attacks (Always-Yes, Always-No, fabri-
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. An Always-Yes attack scenario in PU dynamic settings and vulner-
ability of the existing (context-oblivious) schemes: (a) The trust score of the
Always-Yes attacker is increased when PU is active. (b) In the PU inactive
cycle, the highly trusted attacker deceives the honest SU to believe PU is
active; thus, the honest SU remains inactive and does not use the free channel.
cating) and considering the honest mistakes of the honest
nodes. The analysis is presented for both the context-
oblivious and the proposed context-aware trust schemes.
• With both theoretical analysis and extensive Monte Carlo
simulations, we show that the introduced context-aware
trust scheme significantly increases the resilience of itera-
tive DCSS schemes to ISSDF attacks in dynamic settings.
Adopting the proposed trust scheme enables a mobile
SU network with 20% malicious nodes in a realistic
and dynamic environment to satisfy the false alarm and
missed-detection rates as low as 10−3. For a similar
scenario, the existing trust schemes cannot even achieve
an error rate of 10−1 regardless of the detection threshold.
• We show that our proposed trust framework is able to
effectively mitigate Always-Yes, Always-No and fabri-
cating attacks in different scenarios with high level of
attack severity, even when the majority of the nodes in
the network are malicious. In addition, we show that our
proposed scheme is scalable in terms of network density
and the distance from the PU transmitter.
II. RELATED WORK
The conventional SSDF attacks and mitigation approaches
against them have been well-studied in the literature for
the centralized CSS schemes [7], [10], [11], [14]–[18]. A
known mitigation technique against SSDF attacks is that each
node assigns history-based trust scores to its neighbors and it
weights their sensing reports according to the scores [7]. Re-
cently, average consensus algorithms including gossip-based
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protocols and linear iteration-based schemes have been used
for the DCSS applications [3], [19]–[23]. However, ISSDF
attack in the iterative DCSS schemes is hardly explored.
ISSDF attackers are similar to stubborn agents [24], who
have fixed opinions and do not update their beliefs based on
other agents’ opinions. It is shown that the initial opinion of the
normal (not stubborn) agents have essentially no impact on the
long-run opinion distribution [24]. Sundaram et. al. [25] also
consider a similar attack model aimed at distributed function
calculation using linear iterations where the attackers do not
follow the iterative update protocol and instead arbitrarily
update their values in each iteration. It is shown that the
network graph connectivity is a key factor in resilience to these
malicious nodes [25]. However, the attack introduced in [25]
is different from the ISSDF attack in that the attackers do not
change (falsify) their initial values to affect the cooperation.
A trust-aware gossip-based DCSS scheme has been pro-
posed in [20]; however, it does not consider ISSDF attacks
and does not benefit from the broadcast nature of wireless and
it considers sharing of binary decisions among the nodes. A
proposed approach to mitigate the ISSDF attackers in iterative
DCSS schemes is outlier detection [26], [27] which is based
on detecting the nodes that broadcast values that are deviated
from the rest of the neighbors in each iteration. However, this
approach requires every node to compute a deviation threshold
at each iteration which imposes a significant computational
overhead on each SU. In contrast, in our proposed scheme,
as will be explained, the SUs update the trust scores only
once the consensus iterations are completed and therefore
the computational overhead is low. Liu et. al. [13] propose
a trust scheme using trust propagation and a set of pre-
trusted nodes to mitigate the effect of Byzantine adversaries in
linear iterative consensus in sensor networks. However, trust
propagation is costly and generally there are no pre-trusted
nodes in an ad hoc network.
A distributed and low-overhead trust management scheme
has been proposed recently that is integrated with a consensus-
inspired DCSS scheme to mitigate ISSDF attacks [12]. How-
ever, this scheme is context-oblivious, and as explained in
Section I it cannot mitigate different types of attacks in
dynamic settings. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed
scheme in this paper is the first context-aware trust scheme
for DCSS applications that can effectively mitigate Always-
Yes, Always-No and fabricating ISSDF attackers in dynamic
settings without the need for centralized or pre-trusted nodes.
In addition, our proposed scheme only requires the nodes to
perform a single local trust evaluation per sensing round for
each direct neighbor, thus the overhead is minimal.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a network of n SU nodes that form a mobile
CRAHN. The nodes are moving in a square location area
within the range of a single stationary PU transmitter which
is located outside the square area. Figure 3 depicts the system
overview. Random way point mobility [28] is adopted to model
the SU nodes’ mobility. A network of PU receivers (either
mobile or stationary) may coexist with the SUs in the same
Fig. 3. System overview: Mobile SUs (honest and malicious) are moving
in a square location area with diverse shadow fading. Blue represents lower
received signal strength from the PU transmitter due to deep shadow fades
and red represents higher signal strength.
location area. Therefore, whenever the PU transmitter is active,
the SU’s must remain silent to avoid interference to the PU
receivers. The detection of a PU transmission is modeled as
a binary hypothesis testing problem as follows: H0 if PU is
absent and H1 if PU is present. Each SU is equipped with an
energy detector to perform spectrum sensing by measuring the
received power from the PU transmitter. The received signal
by an SU can be modeled as follows:
y(m) =
{
w(m) H0
s(m) + w(m) H1
(1)
where s(m) is the signal component with power PS and w(m)
is the zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise with noise
power PN . When the PU is inactive, the sensed power at an
SU will essentially be equal to the received noise power. On
the other hand, when the PU is active, the signal component
power PS in dB can be modeled as PT − PL(d)[dB], where
PT is the PU transmission power and PL(d) is the path
loss from the PU to the SU located in distance, d. If the
power detector takes M samples, the test statistic is given by:
Γ = 1M
∑M
m=1 y(m)y(m)
∗. Using the central limit theorem,
it can be shown that for large enough M [29] [30], the test
statistic for a detector follows a normal distribution [31]:
Γ ∼ N (PS + PN , 2(PS + PN )
2
M
) (2)
We model path loss as PL(d) = PL(d) + ψdB [dB] where
PL(d) is the average path loss based on the Hata model
(suburban areas variant) [32], and ψdB is a Gaussian random
variable in dB with zero mean and a standard deviation of
σψdB in dB modeling log-normal shadow fading. Therefore
the total dB loss is characterized by a Gaussian distribution
with mean PL(d) and standard deviation σψdB . The corre-
lation between shadow fading at two locations separated by
distance δ is characterized by A(δ) = σ2ψdBe
−δ/Xc , where
Xc is the decorrelation distance and is usually on the order
of the size of the obstacles in the environment [33] [32].
Therefore, closely located receivers (with smaller δ) experi-
ence highly correlated shadowing. We model shadows in the
environment using random two-dimensional correlated shadow
fading maps [34] similar to the example heatmap shown in
Figure 3.
In a non-cooperative scenario, an SU node decides on
the PU activity by comparing its own received power test
statistic, Γ, with a detection threshold, γ. The spectrum sensing
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performance is characterized by the probability of false alarm
(PFA) and missed-detection (PMD):
PFA = Pr(Γ > γ|H0) and PMD = Pr(Γ < γ|H1) (3)
In a distributed cooperative spectrum sensing model, the SU
nodes first sense and measure the received power and then
share their power measurements with each other to estimate
the average received power. After a number of broadcast
and update iterations, each SU compares its own estimate
of the average power with a threshold to make its final
binary decision about the PU presence. We assume a fixed
communication range for all of the SU nodes in the network.
When a node broadcasts a message, all of the nodes within
its predefined radius (one-hop neighbors) will receive that
message. Obviously, the neighborhoods are always changing
due to the mobility of the nodes; however, we assume that
during one sensing period the SU network topology remains
unchanged. Here we assume perfect communication between
the SUs via a common control channel [35].
In a cooperative spectrum sensing model, a subset of nodes
may be malicious. In this paper, we consider the insistent
spectrum sensing data falsification (ISSDF) attack model [8].
ISSDF attackers broadcast falsified sensing data to their neigh-
bors in order to cause false alarm or missed-detection errors
and to deteriorate the performance of spectrum sensing at
the honest (non-malicious) SU nodes. ISSDF attackers do not
update their estimates according to the cooperation protocol,
instead in order to make the highest impact on the network,
they broadcast their falsified values in all of the iterations. We
consider three types of ISSDF attackers (Always-Yes, Always-
No and fabricating).
In our model, we adopt the trust-aware DCSS scheme
introduced in [12]. The iterative update rule is as follows:
vi(c+1) = θii(t)vi(c)+
∑
j∈Ri θij(t)vj(c)
1 + |Ri| , i = 1, ..., n (4)
where vi(c) denotes the value at SU node i at iteration c, and
Ri is the set of nodes from which node i received a value in
this iteration. θij(t) denotes the trust score of node j at the
current sensing round t in the viewpoint of node i and the self-
trust is θii(t) = 1−
∑
j∈Ri θij(t)
1+|Ri| . The integration of trust scores
as weights into the linear iteration-based consensus scheme,
makes the combination biased so that the values from more
trustworthy neighbors are more effective than the others. The
estimation of the trust scores has been the subject of study of
many of the previous research works that were mentioned in
Section II and different trust schemes have been proposed [7],
[10], [12], [13], [18]. In the next section, we introduce our
novel distributed context-aware trust framework for trust score
derivation which proves to be significantly superior to the
previous methods in realistic dynamic settings.
IV. PROPOSED CONTEXT-AWARE TRUST FRAMEWORK
In a realistic cognitive radio network, the primary user of the
spectrum band transitions between active and inactive states
over time. We show that the dynamics of the PU activity makes
the existing context-oblivious trust management schemes (e.g.
[12], [13]) vulnerable to ISSDF attacks. In the existing trust
schemes, each node records all of its observations from another
node in a single observation vector, regardless of the context
in which the observations are made.
In contrast, we introduce a context-aware trust management
scheme that separates the observations based on the speculated
context (PU-Absent or PU-Present). At each sensing round,
each SU speculates about the PU activity using all of the
available information (from its own sensing and its cooperating
neighbors’ reports) and conjectures the current context. Based
on this speculated context, the SU will record the observations
from its neighbors in the corresponding observation vectors. In
future sections, we show with analysis and experiments that in
realistic dynamic scenarios, our proposed context-aware trust
scheme is superior to the existing context-oblivious schemes
and can effectively mitigate different types of ISSDF attacks.
Next, we elaborate the proposed context-aware trust scheme.
Node i maintains two observation vectors per each peer node
j: 1) “Absent observation vector”, OAij , 2) “Present observation
vector”, OPij . At the end of each sensing round, node i spec-
ulates and sets the context based on its own final cooperative
decision: either PU-Absent or PU-Present. If at this sensing
round node i has received a value from node j, node i
records the observation from node j based on the context.
The observation is recorded in OAij if the current context set
by i is PU-Absent and in OPij if the context is PU-Present. The
observation is binary: 0 is recorded if node i and j disagree and
1 is recorded if the two nodes agree on the PU activity in this
sensing round. The observation vectors are essentially sliding
windows of limited size, thus, if an observation vector is full
at the time of recording a new observation, the oldest entry
will be discarded. Algorithm 1 describes our proposed context-
aware observations for context-aware trust management. gij(t)
denotes the initial value that node i received from neighbor
j in the first consensus iteration of sensing round t, thus,
referring back to Equation (4), gij(t) is equivalent to vj(0).
The final estimate of node i at sensing round t is denoted by
yi(t) which is equivalent to vi(c = final iteration) in Equation
(4). γ denotes the detection threshold.
At sensing round (time) t, node i calculates two trust
scores, θAij(t) and θ
P
ij(t) based on the absent and present
observation vectors, respectively. Equation 5 shows that the
scores are calculated based on the fraction of the observations
that are agreements. H(.) denotes the Hamming weight of
the binary vector and |.| is the length. The required length
of the observation vectors are discussed in Section IV-A in
detail. We adopt the zero trust initialization strategy [12] which
means the trust scores are initialized to zero and remain zero
until the corresponding observation vectors are filled up to the
predefined vector length. In addition, the scores are updated
only when the final decisions are made at each sensing round
and not in between the consensus iterations.
θAij(t) =
H(OAij)
|OijA |
, θPij(t) =
H(OPij)
|OPij |
(5)
In each sensing round, node i cannot make its final decision
(and set the context) before the cooperation is complete in
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Algorithm 1: Proposed context-aware observation for trust
management. Sensing round t: Node i observes node j:
1 if (yi(t) < γ) then // i sets context: PU-Absent
2 if (gij(t) < γ) then // i and j in Agreement
3 oij(t) = 1
4 else // i and j in Conflict
5 oij(t) = 0
6 end
7 Add oij(t) to OAij ; // Add to Absent Vector
8 else if (yi(t) > γ) then // i sets context: PU-Present
9 if (gij(t) > γ) then // i and j in Agreement
10 oij(t) = 1
11 else // i and j in Conflict
12 oij(t) = 0
13 end
14 Add oij(t) to OPij ; // Add to Present Vector
15 end
Fig. 4. Proposed context-aware trust scheme: At each sensing round, node
i updates the trust score assigned to node j based on the minimum of the
scores corresponding to the PU-Absent and PU-Present contexts.
that round. Therefore, during the cooperation, it cannot know
which of the two trust scores (θAij(t) or θ
P
ij(t)) to use for a
peer nodes j. We propose a conservative approach where the
lowest of the two scores is picked as the final trust score:
θij(t) = min(θ
A
ij(t), θ
P
ij(t)) (6)
Figure 4 depicts the context-aware trust update algorithm in
a flow chart representation showing the procedure of node i
updating the trust score assigned to node j at one sensing
round. Following the proposed strategy, the honest nodes take
no risk and as a result, malicious nodes are always detected
and excluded. The conservative score assignment strategy is
advantageous because a node that is malicious in one context
and not malicious in another context is always assigned a low
score corresponding to the context in which it is malicious.
As a result, a malicious node will have minimum effect on
the honest nodes when it performs its malicious behavior.
Consider the example of an Always-Yes attacker j and let us
inspect how it is mitigated by an honest node i. Adopting the
proposed scheme, all of the observations that i makes from
j in the PU-Present context are agreements and all of the
observations in the PU-Absent context are conflicts. Therefore,
node i perceives that node j seems to be non-malicious in PU-
Present context and appears to be malicious in the PU-Absent
context. Since all of the observations corresponding to the
PU-Absent context are conflicts, the PU-Absent context trust
score is zero. Node i assigns the minimum of the PU-Absent
and PU-Present scores, which is zero, to j. As a result, node i
correctly detects the malicious behavior of j and neutralizes its
effect. Thus, separating the observations based on the context
is necessary to detect the attackers. As we showed before in
Figure 2, for the same example, the context-oblivious schemes
are vulnerable and ineffective.
Note that, non-malicious SUs may make honest mistakes
and conjecture the context incorrectly due to shadow fading or
noise (e.g. see simulation results for non-cooperative scenario
in Section VII) which in turn results in an incorrect observation
from a peer node. However, the properties of our proposed
trust scheme helps the honest SUs to gain trust from one
another and to be able to cooperate to correctly conjecture
the context at each sensing round. The facilitating properties
include evaluation of trust based on averaging over vectors
of observations rather than an instantaneous observation and
also the zero trust initialization strategy. In addition, since we
take a conservative strategy for trust assignment, in case of
incorrect context establishment, the malicious SUs cannot gain
high trust. We consider these honest mistakes in our theoretical
analysis in Section V and in our simulations. Our simulation
results presented in Sections VI and VII confirm that the
proposed context-aware trust scheme with conservative score
assignment is significantly more stable than context-oblivious
trust scheme in all of the experimented scenarios.
A. Length of the trust observation vector
Since non-malicious nodes make honest errors, instanta-
neous observations are not sufficient; thus, as described above,
the nodes must make several observations from each other
and store them in vectors and rely on the average scores. The
honest nodes experience different shadowing and noise levels
during time and as they move; therefore, for a sufficiently long
observation vector, the average trust scores are more reliable.
The shadowing characteristic (decorrelation distance or size of
the shadows) and also the mobility characteristics determine
the minimum required length of the observation vectors. For
example, if the shadows are too large or if the nodes move
very slowly, a longer vector may be needed for better trust
evaluations between the nodes so that the effect of shadowing
can be filtered out. On the other hand, shorter vectors may
be preferred in dynamic attack scenarios to achieve fast trust
update response to changes in nodes’ behavior.
In conclusion, the length of the observation vectors must be
determined considering the above trade-offs and the character-
istics of the system. For example, as will be described later in
Section VI, for our particular simulation setup, we found that
the observation vector length of 8 is sufficient. As discussed
before, adopting the zero trust initialization strategy, each SU
initially does not trust any of the other nodes in the network.
An SU can assign a non-zero trust score to another SU as
soon as the observation vectors are of length 8 and some of
the observations are agreements. However, the trust score of
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the malicious SUs will remain low because at least in one
of the two contexts the conflict rate between the honest node
and the attackers is high. The honest nodes then cooperate
with their trusted peers to make more accurate final decisions
that set the context for the future trust evaluations.
B. Mutual trust between two honest nodes
As mentioned before, the honest nodes may make non-
malicious mistakes due to fading and noise; therefore, two
honest nodes may not agree in their spectrum sensing decisions
in a sensing round. In the case of a disagreement between
two honest nodes, both of the nodes will decrease the trust
score assigned to the other node. Decreasing the score of
a non-malicious node that is highly unreliable and reports
incorrect data to its neighbors is desired. Such a scenario
occurs if there are a subset of honest nodes in the network
that experience higher noise or are located in deep shadows
and moving very slowly or not moving out of shadow at all.
However, in a mobile network, where on average all of the
nodes experience the same level of noise and shadowing and
have similar mobility characteristics, the average error rates
are the same for all of the peer non-malicious nodes.
Therefore, the disagreement between two non-malicious
nodes is transient. As discussed before, the trust evaluation
based on averaging over a vector of observations filters out
these transient mistakes. As a result, over a sufficient number
of observations made in both PU-Present and PU-Absent
contexts every two normal honest nodes agree with each other
more than they disagree. As an example for transient distrust
between two honest nodes, consider an honest node i that is
located in a shadow area for a while and thus it incorrectly
decreases the trust score of an honest neighbor j since they
disagree in the PU-Absent context. However, the distrust is
transient because as soon as node i moves out of shadow, the
two nodes start to agree with each other in the PU-Absent
context and i increases the assigned trust score to j.
Certainly, there is an inevitable delay associated with the
transient effect of the mutual distrust of the honest nodes and
this delay will impact the resulting performance negatively.
Nevertheless, this is essentially the cost that we pay for trust
management to prevent the risk of potential attacks and to
mitigate the malicious behavior in the cooperation. As we will
show in our analysis and experiments, this negative effect is
highly dominated by the positive impact of the trust scheme
in detecting and excluding the malicious nodes.
Note that, although we do not explicitly present the mutual
trust scores between the honest SUs in the simulation results,
in all of our experiments honest nodes do assign trust scores
to each other; thus, the presented missed-detection and false
alarm rates do include in them the degradation due to the
transient distrust. We refer the interested reader to a detailed
theoretical analysis and experimental results of the honest-to-
honest trust which we have presented in chapter 6 of [9].
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF CONTEXT-AWARE VERSUS
CONTEXT-OBLIVIOUS TRUST
As described in Section IV, a trust score that a node k1
assigns to another node k2 (denoted by θk1,k2 ) is a measure
of the probability of node k2 being honest in the view of k1.
Node k1 continuously makes observations from k2 and the
trust score is calculated based on the fraction of observations
that are agreements. Therefore, the trust score essentially
approximates the agreement probability in the most recent
set of interactions between the two nodes. In this section, we
analyze the agreement probability between the honest nodes
and the malicious nodes for both the context-oblivious and the
proposed context-aware trust schemes.
A. Context-oblivious trust management
In a context-oblivious trust scheme, node k1 stores its
observations from node k2 in a single observation vector
Ok1,k2 . The event of a node k1 making an observation of
node k2 may occur in two conditions: while PU is absent (H0
is true), and while PU is present (H1 is true). Therefore the
probability of k1 agreeing with k2 can be written as:
Pr(agreek1,k2) = Pr(agreek1,k2 |H0)Pr(H0)
+ Pr(agreek1,k2 |H1)Pr(H1)
(7)
From Equation (7), we can see that if the length of the
observation vector is short relative to the PU activity period,
then depending on whether H0 or H1 is true, one of the two
components in Equation (7) becomes dominant. For example,
when PU is absent for a while, all or most of the observations
in the observation vector may be from this recent PU inactive
cycle and therefore the agreement between the two nodes (and
consequently the trust scores) are affected almost only by the
probability component corresponding to H0. If the observation
vector is much longer than the period of the PU activity, then
on average both probability components corresponding to H0
and H1 will have similar effect in the trust score.
In the following paragraphs, we analyze the probability that
an honest node h1 agrees with a fabricating, Always-Yes or
Always-No attacker. The trust scores that the honest nodes
assign to their peers are essentially measured approximations
of the agreement probabilities.
1) Agreement between honest and fabricating: A fabricat-
ing attacker always reports the opposite of the truth about
the PU activity. Therefore, when an honest node h1 makes
an observation from a fabricating attacker f1, there are two
conditions in which the two nodes agree: 1) when H0 is true
and h1 makes a false alarm error, 2) if H1 is true and h1 makes
a missed-detection error. Equation (8) shows the agreement
probability between the two nodes:
Pr(agreeh1,f1) = Pr(Fh1)Pr(H0) + Pr(Mh1)Pr(H1)
(8)
where, Pr(Fk) and Pr(Mk) of a node k denote the
probability of false alarm and missed-detection of node k,
respectively. If the cooperative decisions of the honest nodes
have very low false alarm and missed-detection rates, the
agreement rate with the fabricating attacker will be very
small as well, thus the assigned trust scores will be small.
However, when honest nodes make honest mistakes either
in the presence or absence of the PU, in both cases they
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incorrectly agree with the fabricating attackers and as a result
their associated trust scores are increased. For example if
PU stays inactive for a while and the honest nodes make
many false alarm errors, most of the observations in the
observation vector Oh1f1 are made in H0 and the probability
of agreement is essentially close to Pr(Fh1) which is high.
As a result, when PU finally becomes active, initially, the
highly trusted fabricating attackers can significantly affect the
detection performance in this cycle.
Therefore, when the context-oblivious strategy is employed,
if either missed-detection or false alarm rate of the honest
nodes is high, due to deep shadow or high noise, the trust score
of fabricating attackers will be increased. We will discuss and
show in our simulation results in the next sections that the
incorrect increase in trust score of fabricating attackers due to
honest mistakes has a destructive effect on the PU detection
performance. In contrast, as shown later, the proposed context-
aware trust scheme alleviates this problem by considering
separate contexts of observations and taking the worst case
(the minimum agreement among the two contexts.)
2) Agreement between honest and Always-Yes: An Always-
Yes attacker always broadcasts reports that indicate the pres-
ence of the PU. Therefore, an honest node h1 agrees with an
Always-Yes attacker, y1, in the following cases: 1) if H0 is true
and node h1 makes a false alarm, 2) if H1 is true and h1 does
not make a missed-detection error and actually decides that
PU is present. Equation (9) derives the agreement probability:
Pr(agreeh1,y1) = Pr(Fh1)Pr(H0) + Pr(Mh1)Pr(H1)
(9)
Obviously, when H1 is true, an Always-Yes attacker’s report is
indeed correct. Therefore, adopting this context-oblivious trust
management scheme, an honest node will incorrectly increase
the trust score of an Always-Yes attacker even when the honest
node has low error rate (in this case when the honest node
does not make missed-detection errors). As we show later,
this shortcoming of the context-oblivious trust management is
significant and results in the inability of the trust scheme to
mitigate Always-Yes attacks.
3) Agreement between honest and Always-No: Similarly,
Equation (10) derives the agreement probability between an
honest node, h1, and an Always-No attacker, n1 :
Pr(agreeh1,n1) = Pr(Fh1)Pr(H0) + Pr(Mh1)Pr(H1)
(10)
Therefore, an honest node (with a low false alarm rate)
increases the trust score of an Always-No attacker when
PU is absent. This makes the context-oblivious trust scheme
vulnerable to Always-No attacks.
B. The proposed context-aware trust management scheme
As described in Section IV, the proposed context-aware
trust scheme separates the observations from each node to
two contexts, PU-Absent and PU-Present. For both contexts,
the event of a node k1 making an observation of another
node k2 may occur either when H0 is true or when H1 is
true. The context is set by k1’s cooperative final decision
which is its best estimate of the PU activity; therefore, “Absent
observations” are not necessarily made while H0 is true and
“Present observations” are not necessarily made while H1 is
true. In this section, we analyze the agreement probability in
both PU-Absent and PU-Present contexts to understand the
trust scores corresponding to each of these contexts.
When a node k1 makes a cooperative final decision to set the
context for its observations, one of the following four events
occurs:
• BA0 : H0 is true and the final decision is PU-Absent.
Pr(BA0 ) = Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1)
• BP0 : H0 is true and the final decision is PU-Present.
Pr(BP0 ) = Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1)
• BA1 : H1 is true and the final decision is PU-Absent.
Pr(BA1 ) = Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
• BP1 : H1 is true and the final decision is PU-Present.
Pr(BP1 ) = Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
Obviously, BP0 and B
A
1 occur when the node makes a false
alarm and missed-detection error, respectively. In contrast, in
the events BA0 and B
P
1 , the node is not in error. We denote the
event where the context is set to PU-Absent by BA, which is
the union of the events BA0 and B
A
1 . Therefore, the probability
of BA can be derived as follows:
Pr(BA) = Pr(BA0 ) + Pr(B
A
1 )
= Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
(11)
Similarly, we denote the event where the context is set to PU-
Present by BP , which is the union of the events BP0 and B
P
1 .
Therefore, we have:
Pr(BP ) = Pr(BP0 ) + Pr(B
P
1 )
= Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
(12)
For a node k1, we can derive the following conditional
probabilities:
Pr(BA0 |BA) =
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
(13)
Pr(BA1 |BA) =
Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
(14)
Pr(BP0 |BP ) =
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
(15)
Pr(BP1 |BP ) =
Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
(16)
We denote the probability of node k1 agreeing with node
k2 in the PU-Absent context and PU-Present context by
Pr(agreeAk1,k2) and Pr(agree
P
k1,k2
), respectively. These prob-
abilities are written in Equations (17) and (18), respectively.
Pr(agreeAk1,k2) =
Pr(agreek1,k2 |BA) = Pr(agreek1,k2 |BA0 )Pr(BA0 |BA)
+ Pr(agreek1,k2 |BA1 )Pr(BA1 |BA)
(17)
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Pr(agreePk1,k2) =
Pr(agreek1,k2 |BP ) = Pr(agreek1,k2 |BP0 )Pr(BP0 |BP )
+ Pr(agreek1,k2 |BP1 )Pr(BP1 |BP )
(18)
1) Agreement between honest and fabricating:
a) PU-Absent context: When honest node h1’s final
decision (and thus the context) is PU-Absent, it records its
observation from a fabricating node f1 in the “Absent obser-
vation vector”, OAh1,f1 . In this context, if H0 is true (the ground
truth is that PU is absent), the two nodes definitely disagree
since the fabricating node’s report indicates that PU is active.
On the other hand, if H1 is true, then the two nodes definitely
agree, because the fabricating node’s report indicates that PU
is inactive in this case. Therefore we have the following:
Pr(agreeh1,f1 |BA0 ) = 0
Pr(agreeh1,f1 |BA1 ) = 1
(19)
As a result by replacement in Equation (17), the probability of
agreement in the PU-Absent context is equal to the probability
that h1 sets the context to PU-Absent while the PU is present
which means h1 must make a missed-detection error. Using
Equation (14), we have the following:
Pr(agreeAh1,f1) = Pr(B
A
1 |BA)
=
Pr(H1)Pr(Mh1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fh1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mh1)
(20)
b) PU-Present context: When honest node h1’s final
decision (and thus the context) is PU-Present, it records
its observation from a fabricating node f1 in the “Present
observation vector”, OPh1,f1 . In this context, if H0 is true, the
two nodes definitely agree since the fabricating node reports
that PU is active. On the other hand, if H1 is true, the two
nodes definitely disagree. Therefore we have the following:
Pr(agreeh1,f1 |BP0 ) = 1
Pr(agreeh1,f1 |BP1 ) = 0
(21)
By replacement in Equation (18), the probability of agreement
in the PU-Present context is equal to the probability that h1
sets the context to PU-Present while the PU is absent which
means h1 must make a false alarm error. Using Equation (15),
we have:
Pr(agreePh1,f1) = Pr(B
P
0 |BP )
=
Pr(H0)Pr(Fh1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fh1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mh1)
(22)
The trust score that node h1 assigns to fabricating node f1 is
then calculated based on the minimum of the scores derived
from the two observation vectors (contexts) as described above
(minimum of (20) and (22).)
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS FOR EVALUATING TRUST-AWARE DCSS
Path Loss and Shadow Fading Random Way Point Model
PU Dist. from CRAHN 15 km CRAHN Area 200m×200m
PU Antenna Height 30 m Min Velocity 1 m/s
SU Antenna Height 1 m Max Velocity 2 m/s
Center Freq. 615 MHz Min Pause 60 s
Log-normal Shadowing
SD (σψdB )
8 dB Max Pause 120 s
Decorrelation Dist. (Xc) 50 m
Transmit Power (PT ) 54 dBm
Noise and Threshold Monte Carlo Simulation
Noise Figure 11 dB # SU Nodes 25
Channel Bandwidth 6 MHz # Consensus Iter. 4
Noise Power (PN ) -95.22 dBm SU Node Range 80 m
Threshold (γ) [-96,-80] dBm Simulation Time 8000 s
Sense Interval 2 s
PU activity period 800 s
2) Agreement between honest and Always-Yes: An Always-
Yes attacker, y1, always reports to an honest node h1 that PU is
active. Therefore, whenever h1’s final decision is PU-Absent,
the observation from y1 is definitely a conflict (probability of
agreement is zero) and is recorded in the “Absent observation
vector”. Note that, the agreement rate is exactly zero regardless
of whether h1 sets the context to PU-Absent by mistake (i.e.
regardless of the ground truth of the PU activity.) Conversely,
whenever h1’s final decision is PU-Present, the observation
from y1 is definitely an agreement (probability of agreement
is one) and is recorded in the “Present observation vector”.
As a result, adopting the context-aware trust, an honest node
always assigns the minimum trust score which is zero to an
Always-Yes attacker and thus can successfully exclude it:
Pr(agreeAh1,y1) = 0
Pr(agreePh1,y1) = 1
min(Pr(agreeAh1,y1), P r(agree
P
h1,y1)) = 0
(23)
3) Agreement between honest and Always-No: An Always-
No attacker, n1, always indicates that PU is inactive to an
honest node h1. Therefore, whenever h1’s final decision is
PU-Absent, the observation from y1 is definitely an agreement
and is recorded in the “Absent observation vector”. Whenever
h1’s final decision is PU-Present, the observation from y1 is
definitely a conflict and is recorded in the “Present observation
vector”. Taking the minimum, an honest node always assigns
a zero trust score to an Always-No attacker, which means the
honest node can successfully exclude the attacker:
Pr(agreeAh1,n1) = 1
Pr(agreePh1,n1) = 0
min(Pr(agreeAh1,n1), P r(agree
P
h1,n1)) = 0
(24)
In the next section, we evaluate the probability of agreement
between an honest node and an attacker (different types) with
simulations in realistic settings. We will show that in all of the
simulation scenarios under different types of attacks, adopting
the context-aware trust scheme significantly reduces the effect
of the attackers by assigning the lowest trust scores to them.
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VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of our Monte Carlo
simulations to evaluate the performance of our proposed
context-aware trust scheme in mitigating the effect of different
types of attackers. Table I describes our simulation setup.
We consider a network of 25 SU nodes that are mobile in
a 200 m×200 m square location area. Each SU node can
communicate with any of the other SU nodes located within
its 80 m radius. We make the assumption that the sensing
frequency of the SUs in the network is much faster than the
PU activity frequency: Each SU senses the spectrum every 2
seconds (as recommended in IEEE 802.22 [36]) and the PU’s
period of activity is 800 seconds with a 50% duty cycle, which
means the PU is active for 400 seconds and inactive for 400
seconds periodically. Each Monte Carlo simulation employs
a different and randomly generated shadow fading map and
it spans 8000 seconds during which the SUs are mobile. In
each sensing round, the number of consensus iterations is 4
(See Equation (4): the iterative update.) From the simulation
parameters, it can be derived that at any point of time each
of the 25 SUs in the network has 11 neighbors on average
(for uniformly distributed nodes in the square location area.)
Since the nodes are moving in the area, their neighborhoods
are constantly changing. The presented results in this section
in terms of false alarm and missed-detection performance are
averaged over 10000 Monte Carlo runs to ensure sufficient
randomness is captured.
As explained in Section IV-A, the minimum required length
for the observation vector is determined by the characteristics
of the system. According to our experimental results, the
length of 8 is sufficient for our system setup and thus we
have fixed Omin = 8 in our experiments that are presented in
this section (no considerable performance improvement was
observed using larger observation vector lengths 16 and 32).
The length of the observation vector, 8, is small compared
to the period of the PU activity. In addition, for this fixed
observation vector length, we experimented with smaller PU
activity period of 80 s and 8 s and no noticeable difference
has been observed in the performance of our proposed context-
aware trust scheme. Zero trust initialization is used in all of
the experiments unless otherwise stated.
A. Mitigating Always-Yes attack
Figure 5 presents the average false alarm and missed-
detection rates from Monte Carlo simulations in a scenario
where 20% of the SUs are Always-Yes attackers. The figure
also depicts the agreement probability between an honest
SU and an Always-Yes attacker based on the analysis in
Sections V-A and V-B and using average false alarm and
missed-detection rates that are measured from the simulations.
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show the results corresponding to
the context-oblivious and the proposed context-aware trust
schemes, respectively. The context-oblivious scheme incor-
rectly assigns high trust scores to the Always-Yes attackers,
since in the PU active cycles, the honest SUs agree with the
Always-Yes nodes. In addition, for low detection thresholds,
where the false alarm rate of the honest SUs is high, they
agree with the Always-Yes attackers even in the PU inactive
cycles. The agreement with Always-Yes attackers decreases as
the threshold increases and false alarm rate decreases.
On the other hand, as discussed in Section V-B2, with
the proposed context-aware scheme, an honest node is able
to correctly assign the trust score of 0 to an Always-Yes
attacker because it takes the minimum of the trust scores in
the PU-Present and PU-Absent contexts (See Equation (23).)
In Figure 5(b) only the minimum of the two agreement prob-
abilities is shown which is 0. Thus, as seen from the figure,
the proposed scheme effectively mitigates the attack and the
false alarm rate sharply drops for the detection thresholds
above the average noise power (vertical black dashed line at
-95.22 dBm.) Thus, in terms of false alarm error rate, the
context-aware trust strategy performs significantly better than
the context-oblivious trust strategy.
In terms of missed-detection, the error rate intuitively in-
creases for higher detection thresholds in both the context-
oblivious and context-aware schemes. Since the Always-Yes
attackers broadcast high values regardless of the PU activity,
the malicious behavior of these attackers is advantageous
when the PU is present. The reason is that the nodes in
shadows might be corrected by cooperating with the Always-
Yes nodes. We call this a positive side-effect of the Always-
Yes malicious behavior. As a result, excluding the attackers has
the counter-intuitive result of higher missed-detection errors.
Since the context-oblivious trust strategy is not as effective as
the context-aware scheme in mitigating Always-Yes attackers,
it results in better missed-detection rate as shown in Figure 5.
Nevertheless, the negative effect of the Always-Yes attackers
is significant when PU is inactive and therefore these attackers
must be mitigated using the trust scheme. Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curves enable us to fairly evaluate our
proposed context-aware trust scheme as we need both of the
missed-detection and false alarm error rates to be as small
as possible at the same time for a given detection threshold.
ROC curves in Figure 6 show missed-detection and false alarm
error rates for a range of detection thresholds (as described in
Table I) in two scenarios: 1) in the presence of 20% Always-
Yes attackers, and 2) with no attackers. It is clear from the
ROC plots that the proposed context-aware trust strategy is
able to effectively contain the attack and maintain the error
rate close to the no-attack case. In conclusion, as the presented
ROC curve reveals, our proposed scheme offers sufficiently
low missed-detection and false alarm rates at the same time
in the presence of Always-Yes attackers.
B. Mitigating Always-No attack
Figure 7 shows the resulting average false alarm and missed-
detection rates of the Monte Carlo simulations for the scenario
where 20% of the SUs conduct Always-No attacks. The
figure presents the results for both context-oblivious and our
proposed context-aware trust schemes. It also depicts the
agreement probability based on the analysis in Sections V-A
and V-B and using average false alarm and missed-detection
rates from the simulations.
As can be seen from the figure, in terms of missed-
detection error rate, the context-aware trust strategy performs
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(b) Proposed context-aware trust management
Fig. 5. 20% Always-Yes ISSDF attack (Vertical dashed lines: Noise power)
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Fig. 6. ROC performance analysis: Resilient DCSS with proposed context-
aware trust scheme mitigating Always-Yes ISSDF attack.
better than the context-oblivious trust strategy. As explained in
Section V-A and shown in Figure 7(a) the context-oblivious
trust incorrectly assigns high trust scores to the Always-No
attackers as the agreement probability is high in all of the PU
inactive cycles. For very low thresholds, where false alarm is
too high, the trust score is low but as the threshold increases
and the false alarm rate drops, in a PU inactive cycle, the
Always-No attackers are in agreement with the honest nodes
and as the duty cycle of PU is 0.5 their trust score approaches
to 0.5. When the threshold is too high and the missed-detection
rate starts to increase, the trust of the Always-No attackers
increases even more because now the agreement between
the honest nodes and the attackers also occurs in the PU
active cycles. On the other hand, as seen from Figure 7(b),
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(b) Proposed context-aware trust management
Fig. 7. 20% Always-No ISSDF attack (Vertical dashed lines: Noise power)
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Fig. 8. ROC performance analysis: Resilient DCSS with proposed context-
aware trust scheme mitigating Always-No ISSDF attack.
with our proposed context-aware trust management, the honest
nodes assign trust of zero to the Always-No attackers (See
Equation (24)) and therefore can effectively mitigate them.
Similar to the case of the Always-Yes attack, here Always-
No attackers have a positive side effect on the false alarm
rate, meaning that since they broadcast low values even when
PU is absent, they will reduce the chance of false alarms in
the network. Therefore, in terms of false alarm rate, at very
low thresholds (below the noise power) the context-oblivious
scheme performs better than the context-aware scheme .
Figure 8 presents the resulting ROC curve for the scenario
20% Always-No attack. It is clear that the proposed context-
aware trust management effectively mitigates the attackers and
maintains a performance close to the no-attack scenario.
0018-9545 (c) 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TVT.2017.2716361, IEEE
Transactions on Vehicular Technology
11
Detection Threshold (dBm)
-95 -90 -85
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
P
FA
P
MD
Pr(agree
h
1
,f
1
)
(a) Context-oblivious trust management
Detection Threshold (dBm)
-95 -90 -85
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
P
FA
P
MD
Pr(agree
h
1
,f
1
A
)
Pr(agree
h
1
,f
1
P
)
min(Pr(agree
h
1
,f
1
A
),Pr(agree
h
1
,f
1
P
))
(b) Proposed context-aware trust management
Fig. 9. 20% Fabricating ISSDF attack (Vertical dashed lines: Noise power)
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Fig. 10. ROC performance analysis: Resilient DCSS with proposed context-
aware trust scheme mitigating fabricating ISSDF attack.
C. Mitigating fabricating attack
Figure 9 compares the performance results and the agree-
ment probabilities of the context-oblivious and context-aware
trust schemes in a scenario where 20% of the SUs are
fabricating attackers. As seen from the results, the proposed
context-aware trust scheme is superior to the context-oblivious
trust in terms of both false alarm and missed-detection.
Fabricating attackers always broadcast a fabricated value
that is the opposite of the true sensing measurement. There-
fore, if an honest node does not make false alarm or missed-
detection mistakes, then in both of the PU active and inac-
tive cycles, the node will be in conflict with a fabricating
attacker. However, if the honest nodes do make erroneous final
decisions, then adopting the context-oblivious trust scheme,
they incorrectly increase the trust of the fabricating attackers
(See Equation (8) in Section V-A.) The honest/fabricating
agreement in the context-oblivious scheme shown in Fig-
ure 9(a) confirms that for both high false alarm rate (for low
thresholds on the left) and high missed-detection rate (for
high thresholds on the right), the honest/fabricating agreement
is increased. As a result the context-oblivious trust scheme
cannot mitigate the impact of the fabricating attackers in these
cases. In high false alarm case (due to high noise), the trusted
fabricating attackers can increase missed-detection rate and in
high missed-detection case (due to deep shadow), the trusted
attackers can increase false alarm rate.
On the other hand, the proposed context-aware trust scheme,
as shown in Figure 9(b), picks the minimum of the trust
scores associated with “Absent observations” and “Present ob-
servations” to filter out the mistakenly high honest/fabricating
agreements at the two extremes of the threshold range. As
a result, a small trust score, close to zero is assigned to the
fabricating attacker. The honest nodes may be unreliable either
because they are likely to make missed-detection errors (high
detection thresholds relative to the signal strength) or false
alarm errors (low thresholds relative to the noise level) but
normally not both at the same time. Therefore, by adopting
the context-aware trust strategy, the honest nodes will be able
to detect the malicious behavior and to update the score of
the fabricating attackers correctly. Our proposed context-aware
trust management scheme is more cautious, by separating
the observations in PU-Present and PU-Absent contexts and
picking the minimum of the two scores (See Equations (20)
and (22).) The ROC curves in Figure 10 clearly show that the
context-aware trust is essential and effective in mitigating the
attack in the case of fabricating attack as well.
D. Discussion on the simulation results
The results presented in this section for various scenarios
reveal that by adopting the proposed context-aware scheme,
the resultant performance is consistent across all of the three
types of attacks. As shown in Figures 5, 7, and 9, unlike the
context-oblivious scheme, the context-aware scheme results
in the same missed-detection and false alarm rates in all of
the three cases by maintaining a trust score of zero or close
to zero for the attackers. Similarly, the ROC plots in Fig-
ures 6, 8, and 10, confirm that our scheme offers essentially the
same performance for all of the attack cases by successfully
neutralizing the attackers (which form 20% of the network).
Therefore, the proposed trust scheme offers a comprehensive
solution for mitigating different attack scenarios.
In the next section, we continue our analysis and compar-
ison with respect to different characteristics of the network
including the attack severity, the SU network density and the
distance of the network to the PU. In addition, we analyze the
dynamic range of the detection threshold in different scenarios
to satisfy a desired performance in the presence of attackers.
VII. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Mitigating attacks of different severity levels
In Figure 11 we analyze a few examples of simulation runs
that show the progress over time of the average of the trust
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scores that the honest nodes in the network assign to one
typical Always-Yes attacker. For this particular simulation, we
have fixed the detection threshold to -93 dBm, a middle thresh-
old where the average error rates for the honest nodes is not at
high rates (at this threshold, the measured average probabilities
of false alarm and missed-detection for an individual honest
node are 0.0007 and 0.0276, respectively.)
The simulation spans 4000 sensing rounds (8000 s) and
during this time the nodes are mobile. The shown plots have
one data point per 50 s. For this set of experiments, we
enforced an initial trust score of 0.5 for all of the nodes (rather
than initializing to zero) in order to show how the honest nodes
are able to reduce the trust of an attacker from 0.5 to zero and
to maintain the zero trust. Figure 11(a) shows the results where
20% of the nodes are attackers. As expected, in the context-
oblivious trust scheme, the trust of the Always-Yes attacker is
increased whenever PU is active. The randomness of the trust
score is due to the mobility of the nodes and the changes in
the neighborhoods; nevertheless, the increase in the trust score
in active cycles (shaded areas) is clearly seen. As mentioned
before, this is the reason why the context-oblivious trust is not
effective in mitigating the attackers.
Note that, with the context-oblivious scheme, the assigned
trust to the Always-Yes attacker remains high in most of the in-
active cycles (white areas) showing only a small decrease. This
clearly shows that once the ISSDF Always-Yes attackers in
the network gained increased trust (in the active cycles), they
strongly affect the final decisions of the honest nodes in the
inactive cycles. Since the honest nodes mistakenly decide PU
is active, the Always-Yes attackers appear to be in agreement
with the honest nodes which in turn makes the honest nodes
believe the attackers are trustworthy. As a result, the trust
associated with the attacker is hardly decreased. In contrast,
the proposed context-aware trust scheme, successfully reduces
the trust of the Always-Yes attacker from the initial trust score
down to 0 and keeps it low and therefore effectively excludes
the malicious node. Figure 11(b) compares the trust progress
in different attack severity scenarios. All of the attackers in the
network are of the same type (i.e. Always-Yes) and thus they
strengthen each other’s effect. As seen in the plot, the proposed
context-aware trust successfully reduces the trust score of the
attacker to zero even when the majority of the nodes are
attackers (60%). The Always-Yes attackers initially have a
trust score of 0.5 in the viewpoint of all of the honest nodes
in the network. As the honest nodes observe these attackers,
they fill up their observation vectors corresponding to both the
PU-Absent and PU-Present contexts. As soon as the number
of observations in a vector reaches the predefined minimum (8
observations), the trust score that is calculated based on these
observations (Equation (5)) replaces the initial 0.5 score.
As described in the previous section, whenever the final
decision of an honest node is PU-Absent, its observation from
an Always-Yes attacker will be a conflict. Therefore, as soon
as 8 PU-Absent observations are made from an Always-Yes
attacker, the score corresponding to PU-Absent context will
be zero and thus the honest node assigns the smaller trust
score of the two contexts (which is zero) to the attacker (See
Equation (23).) Although in our experiment, the PU is absent
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Fig. 12. ROC performance analysis: The proposed resilient DCSS scheme
with context-aware trust under various Always-Yes ISSDF attack severity.
half of the time, initially due to the effect of the Always-Yes
attackers (with initial trust scores of 0.5), the honest nodes are
misled to decide that the PU is present most of the time. As
a result, the PU-Absent observation vectors of an honest node
get filled-up (i.e. reaches 8 observations) in a longer period
of time compared with a no-attack scenario. The more severe
the attack is, the attackers are initially more effective and it
takes the honest nodes a longer time and a larger number of
observations to fill their PU-Absent vectors. As a result, for
more severe attacks, the convergence of the trust score towards
zero takes a longer time. However, as seen in Figure 11(b)
in all of the attack scenarios including the most severe ones,
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eventually, the trust is reduced to zero. Therefore, the attackers
are completely neutralized.
Figure 12 shows the ROC results of Monte Carlo simu-
lations of Always-Yes attack scenarios of different severity
levels. This figure is an extension to the previously shown Fig-
ure 6, where only 20% attack was considered. The simulation
setup is the same as the setup described in Section VI (thus,
adopting the zero trust initialization strategy.) The proposed
scheme successfully mitigates the attacks in all of the scenarios
including the case where the majority of the SUs are malicious.
For comparison, we also show ROC of the non-cooperative
case where the SU nodes make decisions independently with-
out cooperation. Thus, in the non-cooperative scenario, the
SU nodes are greatly affected by shadow fading and noise
but they are not affected by ISSDF attackers. By utilizing
the context-aware trust scheme, even under the most severe
attack (i.e. 60% of the network), the resulting performance
of the cooperative spectrum sensing is significantly better
than the non-cooperative scenario. Therefore, the trust scheme
successfully restricts the destructive effect of the attackers on
the cooperation.
As shown before, the performance of the proposed trust
scheme is consistent across different types of attacks. Similar
results for attack severity scalability are achieved for Always-
No and fabricating attacks. These results show that our pro-
posed trust scheme is able to alleviate various attacks of
different severity levels, thus, it provides an effective defense
system against ISSDF for a wide variety of realistic scenarios.
B. Enhanced detection threshold dynamic range
Figure 13 compares the ranges of the detection thresholds
that satisfy different operating regions in terms of missed-
detection and false alarm rates for different scenarios. Under
20% Always-Yes attack, the context-aware trust helps to main-
tain the dynamic range of the detection threshold to approach
to the honest case. In contrast, using the context-oblivious trust
scheme, the attack affects the network significantly; as a result,
regardless of the detection threshold, none of the operating
regions, not even the most relaxed one (10−1 error rate) can be
achieved. The presented results confirm the significance of the
proposed trust scheme in enhancing the flexibility and relaxing
the sensitivity requirements of the cognitive radio devices.
C. Scalability of the proposed trust scheme
In this section, we analyze the scalability of the proposed
context-aware trust scheme for DCSS in terms of SU network
density and distance of the SU network from the PU transmit-
ter. Figure 14(a) shows the performance results for variable
network density for a fixed detection threshold of -94 dBm
where 20% of the nodes are fabricating attackers. In all of
our experiments in the previous sections, we considered 25
SU nodes in a 200 m×200 m location area (i.e. density of
625 SUs per km2). In Figure 14(a), however, the number of
SU nodes is varied from only 5 nodes up to 50 nodes in the
same area size which results in a density of 125 up to 1250
SUs per km2. Therefore, we consider a variety of scenarios
from a sparse to a dense SU network. In this set of simulations
we use the same setup (e.g. PU activity, SU mobility, 15 km
distance from the PU transmitter) as described in Table I.
For a higher SU network density, there are more nodes
in the neighborhoods and in general there is more diversity
in the network that can be exploited by cooperation. As a
result, both PMD and PFA should improve when the density
of the network is increased. However, at the same time, in
a denser network, the attackers get greater opportunity to
propagate their falsified values in the network if they are
not properly contained by the trust management scheme. The
results presented in Figure 14(a) shows that using the context-
oblivious trust, the false alarm rate of the 375 SUs/km2 case
is higher than that of the 125 SUs/km2 case. For denser
networks, then the error rates decrease, but both false alarm
and missed-detection rates remain relatively high even in the
densest case. This confirms that the attackers are not mitigated
adequately by the context-oblivious scheme.
In contrast, our proposed context-aware trust scheme limits
the impact of the attackers and therefore, increasing the density
of the nodes is beneficial as the diversity is increased. In
conclusion, our proposed trust-aware DCSS scheme scales
well with the network density and performs notably better than
the context-oblivious trust regardless of the network density.
In fact, as it is clear from Figure 14(a), the gap between the
proposed scheme and the contexts-oblivious scheme becomes
more significant for denser networks.
In Figure 14(b), we analyze the scalability in terms of the
distance between the SU network of 25 nodes and the PU
transmitter. Increasing the PU distance results in a decrease in
the average received signal to noise ratio by the SU nodes,
therefore, the missed-detection rate increases with distance
as shown in Figure 14(b). Note that the false alarm rate
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distance from PU. Attack scenario: 20% fabricating attackers. Detection
threshold = -94 dBm.
depends on the noise level and not the signal strength, thus not
shown. The results show that the proposed context-aware trust
scheme performs significantly better than the context-oblivious
scheme, regardless of the distance.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We present a novel context-aware trust management scheme
that is integrated into distributed cooperative spectrum sensing
and is shown to significantly increase the resilience of the
distributed cooperation to insistent spectrum sensing data falsi-
fication (ISSDF) attacks. Unlike the existing trust schemes, the
proposed method enables the secondary users to perform more
informed trust evaluations of their peers based on the context
(whether the primary user is absent or present.) As a result our
trust scheme is effective in mitigating the attackers in realistic
dynamic scenarios where the primary user of the channel
frequently transitions between active and inactive. We evaluate
our proposed trust management scheme under Always-Yes,
Always-No, and fabricating ISSDF attacks via both theoretical
analysis and extensive Monte Carlo simulations. We developed
a realistic model where the mobile cognitive radio ad hoc
network operates in TV white space and the primary user
transmitter’s activity is changing over time. We show the
scalability of the proposed scheme in terms of attack severity,
network density and the distance of the secondary network
from the primary user transmitter. Furthermore, the dynamic
range of the sensitivity of the cognitive radios is shown to be
considerably improved, benefiting from the proposed context-
aware trust scheme.
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